A homeowners policy contained the following provision, in common with most such policies: "We do not cover bodily injury or property damage arising out of the ownership, maintenance, use, occupancy, renting, loaning, entrusting, loading or unloading of any motorized land vehicle or trailer. However, this exclusion does not apply to: a) a motorized land vehicle in dead storage or used exclusively on an insured premises. . . ." This provision was pertinent to personal liability insurance included in the policy.

A young man (hereafter called "the insured"), who lived with his parents, was an insured by definition under the policy. He owned a vintage automobile that he purchased for show, not for driving. The record showed that, whenever it was moved from its regular location for such attention as body work or painting and for show purposes, it was transported on a truck-pulled trailer. It was moved in such a manner to the residence of friends, who had facilities he could use to regularly tune and clean his pride and joy.

The insured was moving a kerosene heater from the floor of his neighbors' garage, where he was fixing his car's gas gauge, because a bucket into which he was draining gasoline from the gas tank was overflowing. The gas ignited and fire extensively damaged his hosts' property as well as the vintage car. The friends' insurer paid them $125,000 for their loss and brought action against the car owner, seeking subrogation.

Both insurers sought court determination of whether or not the vehicle was in dead storage. The car owner's insurer appealed from summary judgment to the effect that the vehicle had been in dead storage and that its policy covered the subrogation claim.

The young man's insurer argued that "dead" in this context means "totally inoperable, incapable of any function whatever." It said that "storage" means that which is put "beyond use, beyond any handling or dealing with. . . .in the ordinary course of things." It contended that the car was not in dead storage because it "was fully operable, was in fact driven from place to place, was being used as an automobile and was regularly repaired and maintained."

The appeal court determined that the insured kept his car on the property of his friends in dead storage within the homeowners policy meaning of the term. The fact that it was operable, that he drove it from their driveway to their garage, that he bought license tags for it when he didn't have to, and that he was working on it when the accident occurred did not change its status from being in dead storage. The car was kept as a "collectable," not as a means of transportation.

The court cited Sharpe v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 558 F. Supp. 10 (E.D. Tenn. 1982). The circumstances there were virtually identical to those here. The fact that vintage vehicles were occasionally driven around their owner's property did not change their "dead storage" status when they were destroyed in a fire.

The judgment of the trial court, in the case at hand, was affirmed against the car owner's homeowners policy insurer. The appeal court concluded that the car was in dead storage within the policy meaning.

(ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant v. GEIWITZ ET AL., Appellees. Maryland Court of Special Appeals. No. 922, 1990. April 3, 1991. CCH 1991 Fire and Casualty Cases, Paragraph 3093.)